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On a sunny morning in May 1931, crowds gathered in the gardens of the Rhine Palace in 
Strasbourg to await the unveiling of a statue honouring the nineteenth century French authors, 
Victor Hugo and Lamartine.  When the moment arrived, academics and politicians made 
celebratory speeches as the audience waved tricolour flags.  The following day, reports in the 
national press applauded the local population’s united display of French patriotism and 
described the ‘[echoing] of the Marseillaise through the Kaiser’s former palace.’1  But in 
Strasbourg such unity appeared to be a world away when the city council discussed the 
ceremony the following month and the Mayor, Charles Hueber, criticised the monument 
committee for failing to inform him where it planned to place the statue.  In the ensuing 
debate, councillor Camille Dahlet suggested that the event revealed more than an error of 
judgement.  For Dahlet, the imposition of the monument represented an attempt to enforce a 
‘Parisian’ national identity onto the Alsatian population, and a rejection of the sense of 
identity that the Alsatians had forged for themselves.  The French were thus repeating 
mistakes made by the Berlin government during the region’s annexation into the German 
Empire between 1871 and 1918.  As a result, national governments would be better advised 
to give the Alsatians ‘standardised monuments’ with ‘detachable heads.’ This would remove 
the need to destroy entire monuments at moments of regime change, and, had it been the case 
earlier, Strasbourg could have simply replaced the heads of the three Hohenzollern emperors 
that adorned the main post office with those of their liberators, Marshals Foch, Joffre and 
Pétain.2 
 The controversy surrounding the Hugo-Lamartine monument was not an isolated 
incident.  In 1918, Alsace had returned to France after forty-seven years of annexation into 
Germany, and, in the intervening years, government attempts to introduce the French 
language, legislation and administrative institutions had met with widespread local 
resistance.3 After more than a decade of French rule, Dahlet’s complaint reflected growing 
frustration with the imposition of French ‘national propaganda’ that took no account of local 
particularities.  In this atmosphere, Strasbourg became the site of conflict between opposing 
views of Alsace, and its relationship to France and Germany. And, the city’s urban spaces, 
and the monuments and festivities that filled them, offered a means to express attitudes 
towards the region, the nation and the border for local and national elites and for the city’s 
population.  What is more, they offered a means of gauging popular opinion in the city for 
outside observers, who carefully monitored urban politics in Strasbourg. The resulting 
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tensions reveal the misunderstandings which developed between the government in Paris and 
the population in Alsace. Yet the crisis that occurred in interwar Strasbourg cannot be written 
off as a simple case of regional exceptionalism.  On the contrary, it tells us much about the 
different meanings invested in borders and is revealing of the crisis triggered by the return of 
Alsace to France. 
In recent decades, studies of nationbuilding in Europe have fruitfully focussed upon 
individual regions as a means to unearth the ways in which national attachment was 
understood and articulated at grassroots level. Work on French regional identity has 
presented integration as the product of interaction between the centre and periphery, and the 
creation of national identity as a process ‘continually in the making,’ rather than the 
imposition of a fixed set of beliefs.4  Research has demonstrated that Germanness was rooted 
in regional and local experiences, while studies of Spain, Russia and Italy have underlined the 
reciprocal character of nationbuilding.5  Given this ‘regional turn’ it is unsurprising that 
literature on nationbuilding has increasingly argued for a focus on the role played by borders 
and borderlands in the construction of nations and identities.6  Border regions represent not 
only the frontier of the national territory, but also a site of contact with populations on the 
other side of the boundary, where distinct understandings of language, citizenship, culture 
and religion interact and come into conflict.  It is through this interaction that sentiments of 
nationalism are created from below.7  After all, borders are constructed of more than fences 
and checkpoints, and the study of borderlands can reveal the political construction of borders 
between two communities which may share a language, ethnicity or may even have been 
members of the same nation-state.8  
Case studies have offered different models for understanding loyalties as they emerge 
in borderlands, suggesting that no single model fits all European border regions.9  Work on 
central and eastern Europe has rejected the assumption that nationalisation is natural or 
                                                
4 Caroline Ford. Creating the Nation in Provincial France.  Religion and Political Identity in Brittany 
(Princeton, 1993), 5; Kolleen M. Guy, When Champagne became French.  Wine and the Making of a 
National Identity (London and Baltimore, 2003); Timothy Baycroft, Culture, Identity and Nationalism.  French 
Flanders in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Woodbridge, 2004).  Much of this work challenged the 
dominant interpretation of a centre-outward, top-down model proposed by Eugen Weber in Peasants into 
Frenchmen.  The Modernization of Rural France (Stanford, 1976). 
5 Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor.  Württemburg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 
1871-1918 (Chapel Hill, 1997); Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-
Century Germany (Cambridge, 2001); Miguel Cabo and Fernando Molina, ‘The Long and Winding Road of 
Nationalization: Eugen Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen in Modern European History,’ European History 
Quarterly 39 (2009):  264-286. 
6 Hastings Donnan & Thomas Wilson, Border Identities.  Nation and State at International Frontiers 
(Cambridge, 1998); Henrice Altink & Sharif Gemie (eds), At The Border: Margins And Peripheries In Modern 
France (Cardiff, 2008); David Laven & Timothy Baycroft, ‘Border Regions and Identity,’ European Review of 
History- Revue Européenne d’histoire 15 (2008): 255-275; Timothy Baycroft, Carolyn Grohmann & Paul 
Lawrence, ‘“Degrees of Foreignness” and the Construction of Identity in French Border Regions during the 
Interwar Period,’ Contemporary European History, 10 (2001): 51-71. 
7 Laird Boswell, ‘Rethinking the Nation at the Periphery,’ French Politics, Culture & Society 27 (2009): 111-
126, 120.  
8 Edith Sheffer, ‘On Edge: Building the Border in East and West Germany,’ Central European History 40 
(2007): 307-339.   
9 Timothy Baycroft, ‘Changing Identities in the Franco-Belgian Borderland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries,’ French History 13 (1999): 417-38; Annemarie H. Sammartino, The Impossible Border.  Germany 
and the East, 1914-1922 (Ithaca N.Y., 2010); Peter Thaler, Of Mind and Matter.  The Duality of National 
Identity in the German-Danish Borderlands (West Lafayette, IN., 2010); Peter Thaler, ‘Fluid Identities in 
Central European Borderlands,’ European History Quarterly 31 (2001): 519-548; Michiel Baud and Willem van 
Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,’Journal of World History 8 (1997): 211-242. 
inevitable, and encouraged attention to ‘national indifference’ as a category of analysis.10  
Research into the Franco-Spanish border has, on the one hand, revealed the increasingly 
‘national’ language used by French and Spanish inhabitants of the eastern Pyrenees in 
community quarrels, and on the other, suggested that in the western Pyrenees an enduring 
cross-border sentiment persisted even during wartime.11  
Literature on Alsace has underlined the complex nature of identities on the Franco-
German border.  Elizabeth Vlossak and David Harvey have shown that regional and national 
loyalties interacted with gender and class, while Christopher Fischer has underlined the 
pervasive and multifaceted character of regional attachment in Alsace.12  Christian Baechler 
and Samuel Goodfellow have stressed the importance of local concerns as a driving force in 
Alsatian politics, while Laird Boswell has underscored Alsace’s role in the refashioning of 
notions of Frenchness after 1918.13  This research has revealed Alsatian identities to be 
contested, fluid and frequently oppositional, and critiques the idea that the border is 
unchanging, uncontested and unproblematic. Yet, it also raises questions over how the 
meanings invested in borders change over time, and invites further research into how such 
understandings vary between centre and periphery. 
The case of urban politics in interwar Strasbourg offers a neat illustration of this 
negotiation between centre and periphery and the shifting priorities that affected border 
rhetoric.  During the two decades after Alsace’s 1918 return to France, elite groups in Paris 
and Alsace debated how the French language, administrative institutions and legislation 
should be introduced into the region.  But, divisions in Paris and in Alsace interacted to stunt 
this process. The result was that integration in Alsace did not follow the pattern of the two-
way interaction identified by Caroline Ford in her influential study of France’s western 
periphery.14  Instead it adopted the form of a multi-centred struggle, involving a range of 
internal and external stakeholders.  These debates took place against the backdrop of Franco-
German diplomatic rivalry that crystallised on the Rhenish border.15  France’s concern (and 
overestimation) of the German threat intersected with the region’s symbolic place at the heart 
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of the nationalist cult of the ‘lost provinces’ that emerged after German annexation in 1871, 
with the result that Alsace became one of the most significant borderlands on the European 
continent.16  For the French, it was a frontier of ‘Frenchness’, not just of France.  Yet 
Alsatians had experienced forty-seven years of separation from France, and during this period 
a strong sense of regional attachment had emerged.17  And, with links to Germany through 
language, culture, and, in many cases, family ties, in the eyes of Strasbourg inhabitants such 
as Dahlet, Alsace was a meeting point or a ‘bridge’ for French and German cultures.18 
Using the controversies that surrounded urban politics in interwar Strasbourg, this 
article re-evaluates the dynamics of grassroots national belonging and reconsiders the 
relationship between border regions and nation-states. While borders are shared, the focus 
here falls on France.  This perspective connects ideas of the border with understandings of 
nationhood in a state that has long defined itself by the idea of its historic, natural frontiers: 
the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees and the ocean.19  Section one charts Strasbourg’s 
development prior to its 1918 return to France, before moving on to a discussion of the city’s 
relations with Paris after 1918.  Section two explores the uses to which the city’s spaces were 
put through festivals, and section three shifts focus to attempts to fix a national and political 
symbolism with the construction of monuments that reflected Strasbourg’s cultural heritage.  
The size of the constituencies represented by the individuals and groups that engaged in these 
discussions varied, but the debates and controversies afford a glimpse into the range of 
responses to the question of how regional, national and cross-border attachments and 
relationships should be reconciled. These discussions were dominated by an understanding of 
Strasbourg as the limits of the French nation.  But, this idea interacted with understandings of 
the city as the heart of a cross-border community and as a regional capital. The rhetoric of the 
frontier became part of daily life as elite groups and Strasbourg’s population attempted to 




Strasbourg lies on the bank of the river Rhine in the region of Alsace.  The Vosges mountain 
range and the French provinces of Lorraine and the Franche-Comté are to the west, while 
Germany faces the city across the river.  In the middle ages, Strasbourg’s position on the 
Rhine meant that it became a centre of riverboat traffic, and the city diocese covered the left 
and right banks of the river.  After Strasbourg’s incorporation into France in 1681, the city 
became the first line of defence against attack from the east.  As a result, the new French 
rulers oversaw the construction of a series of military defences culminating in the Vauban 
fortifications at the end of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth. 20  After 
1871, and the annexation of Alsace and a section of Lorraine into the German Empire, Field-
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Marshal Moltke supervised the construction of fortifications around the city and surrounding 
area to ensure that it became ‘unassailable.’21   
Strasbourg’s position meant that it was not merely the last line of defence, but also an 
economic, linguistic, cultural and religious meeting point between France and Germany.  
After its seventeenth century attachment to France, Strasbourg continued to trade with 
neighbouring German states.  French language use increased, but Alsatian dialect remained 
the language of the majority and Strasbourg intellectuals adopted a key role as translators in 
the eighteenth century republic of letters.22  The University of Strasbourg attracted students 
and staff from east and west, including the author Goethe and scientist Louis Pasteur, and the 
city’s theatres hosted troupes from Paris alongside German musicians such as Mozart.23  
Until the Revolution, Alsace was the only part of France where Protestantism was legal, and 
throughout the nineteenth century Strasbourg remained the site of religious co-existence and 
interaction.24  It was the seat of the Catholic diocese of Alsace, and the headquarters of the 
Lutheran Church of France and the Faculty of Protestant Theology as well as the 
administrative seat of Calvinist and Jewish consistories responsible for regional affairs.25  
Strasbourg’s Cathedral, remarkable for its single spire, was a notable local landmark and 
reminder of the city’s Germanic past.  After 1871, it became a focus for French national 
sentiment.26 
Strasbourg was also an important administrative centre.  During the years of German 
rule, it became the regional political capital for the annexed territories, the Reichsland Elsass-
Lothringen.27  Immigrants from across Alsace and Germany swelled its population and 
encouraged the development of housing and infrastructure.28   The city landscape also 
changed; streets were re-named to pay tribute to German history, statues were erected to 
honour German figures, and ambitious building projects were undertaken to showcase 
German architecture and to signal its position within the new Empire.  Strasbourg’s Neustadt 
(new town) was connected to the old city by the Kaiserplatz, a square whose central gardens 
were bordered by the Imperial Palace, the Landtag (regional Parliament) and University 
Library.  At the centre was a statue of Wilhelm I, and on the outskirts of the square the 
                                                
21 ‘Strasbourg.  German Plans for Strengthening the Fortifications,’ The New York Times, 20 July 1872; Philippe 
Burtscher & Francois Hoff, Les Fortifications d'Alsace Lorraine 1870-1918 (Paris, 2008). 
22 Franklin L. Ford, Strasbourg in Transition, 1658-1789 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). 
23 The number of students from France, German and Alsace fluctuated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  See John A. Craig, Scholarship and Nation Building.  The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian 
Society, 1870 -1939 (Chicago, 1984). 
24 Thomas A. Brady, Ruling Class, Regime and Reformation at Strasbourg 1520-1555 (Leiden, 1978); Francis 
Rapp, Réformes et Réformation d Strasbourg. Eglise et société dans le diocese de Strasbourg 1450-1525 (Paris, 
1974). 
25 Anthony J. Steinhoff, The Gods of the City. Protestantism and Religious Culture in Strasbourg, 1870-1914  
(Leiden, 2008): 13. 
26 Mayeur, ‘A Frontier Memory: Alsace’, 413. 
27 Dan P. Silverman, Reluctant Union.  Alsace-Lorraine and Imperial Germany, 1871-1918 (London and 
Pennsylvania, 1972); Hermann Hiery, Reichstagswahlen im Reichsland.  Ein Beitrag zur Landesgeschichte von 
Elsaß-Lothringen und zur Wahlgeschichte des Deutsches Reiches 1871-1918 (Dusseldorf, 1986); Annette Maas, 
‘Kriegerdenkmäler und Erinnerungsfeiern im Elsaß und in Lothringen (1870-1918): Von nationaler 
Konfrontation zu regionaler Versöhnung in einer Grenzregion,’ in Sabine Behrenbeck (ed.), Historische 
Denkmäler: Vergangenheit im Dienste der Gegenwart (Bergisch Gladbach, 1994): 55-68. 
28 Archives Municipales de la Ville et la Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg (AMVCUS) Fonds Jacques 
Peirotes 125Z 39, 12, Propositions en vue de l’amélioration des Lois sur les Habitations à Bon Marché, 11 
December 1922.  See also Stefan Fisch, ‘Planung als Eigentumsbeschränkung in der Obrigkeitstadt: 
Bemerkungen zur Straßburger Stadtwicklung, 1871-1918,’ in Rainer Hudemann and Rolf Wittenbrock (eds) 
Stadtentwicklung im deustch-franzözisch-luxembrgischen Grenzraum (Saarbrücken, 1991): 179-98 and Harold 
Hammer-Schenk, ‘Die Stadterweiterung Straßburgs nach 1870.  Politische Vorgaben historischer Stadtplanung,’ 
in Michael Brix and Monika Steinhauser, Historismus in Deutschland (Lahn-Giessen, 1978): 121-141. 
central post office was adorned with statues of Kaisers Wilhelm I, Friedrich III and Wilhelm 
II. 
Such attempts at Germanisation were contested by Francophile Alsatians, as 
Christopher Fischer has shown.29  Their presentation of the city as inherently French found its 
clearest expression in the musée alsacien, which opened in 1907.  Located in a traditional 
half-timbered house, and filled with displays of woodcarving, metalwork, traditional dress, 
toys, and household religious objects, the museum attempted to present an image of a 
timeless, unchanging, and French Alsace. ‘French Alsace’ was also promoted in the pages of 
Francophile publications such as the Revue Alsacienne Illustrée and popular images d’Epinal, 
notably those produced by Francophile artist and author Jean-Jacques Waltz, better known as 
Hansi.  In this way, understandings of Strasbourg as the historic western limits of Germany 
co-existed with and were challenged by ideas of Strasbourg as France’s lost frontier. 
When war broke out in 1914, Strasbourg’s young men entered the German army and 
the city’s civilians experienced the shortages and disruption of life on the home front. As the 
war neared its end, revolution swept through the city and Soviets debated two possible 
futures; the first was Alsatian neutrality, the second return to France.  It was the pro-French 
current which triumphed, and France’s troops entered the city on 22 November 1918.  After 
regaining Alsace the French government re-designated Strasbourg the departmental capital of 
the northern Alsatian department of the Bas-Rhin, as it had been before 1871.30  But, it was 
also named the seat of the General Commission which had responsibility for managing the 
reintegration of Alsace and annexed Lorraine (the Moselle) into France.  French 
administrators arrived in the city, and many expressed their surprise that most people spoke 
Alsatian, a dialect that allowed them to understand German, but little or no French.  For 
Alsatians, however, use of Alsatian dialect and German was a natural feature of life in the 
borderland, and parties from the left to the right of the political spectrum argued in favour of 
bilingualism in the region. 
As the French arrived after 1918, many of the German migrants who had moved to 
the city since 1871 left.  Some did so voluntarily, while others were forced out as a wave of 
spontaneous purges and officially organised trials, the ‘commissions de triage’, followed the 
restoration of French rule.31  The departing Germans were replaced by administrators, 
teachers and soldiers from across the Vosges.  These new arrivals were known by locals as 
‘Français de l’Intérieur’, a label which underlined the Alsatians’ sense of their own 
difference.  The preferential treatment which these incomers received generated frustrations 
amongst Strasbourg’s population.  Other new arrivals, including migrants from the Alsatian 
countryside and returning optants (those who had chosen to leave the region in 1871 rather 
than become German) increased the urban population after 1918.32 
The return to France altered the city’s political landscape.  Politics in the Reichsland 
had been dominated by three parties; the Catholic Centre, the Liberals and the Socialist 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD).  After 1918, the Centre formed a new 
Catholic party, the Union Populaire Républicaine (UPR), and the Liberals fragmented; some 
created the conservative Democrat party, while others migrated to the newly formed Alsatian 
Federation of the Radical Party. The Alsatian Socialists voted unanimously to join the French 
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Socialist Party (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, or SFIO) in 1919, and were 
finally able to win power in the city in the 1919 municipal elections.  German municipal law 
stipulated that the government nominate all mayors, which meant that the SPD had been 
unable to translate its strong municipal polling into positions of power on the local council.  
This changed in 1919, when local SFIO leader Jacques Peirotes was elected mayor of 
Strasbourg.33  But, the SFIO was severely weakened the following year when the majority of 
its members left to form the Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, or PCF).34 
During the 1920s, these parties voiced their increasing frustration with the return to 
France.  Problems in reintegrating the region’s economy left large sections of Alsatian society 
feeling disadvantaged, while the imposition of the French language left many unable to 
progress in their careers, defend themselves in court, or understand their school lessons. 
Political leaders from all shades of the political spectrum called for bilingualism, to prevent 
the ‘sacrifice of a generation.’ 35 The press expressed concern that the introduction of French 
legislation would lead to the loss of hard-won privileges, notably in terms of welfare and 
municipal autonomy.  And, religious leaders voiced concern that France planned to introduce 
the laws of separation of Church and State into the recovered departments to make them tally 
with the rest of France, where separation had been introduced in 1905.   
The separation issue proved the catalyst for organised resistance in 1924 when the 
newly elected centre-left Radical Premier Edouard Herriot announced his intention to 
separate Church and State in the recovered departments. The declaration provoked 
widespread and spontaneous demonstrations, leading Herriot to postpone the introduction of 
the laws.  It also united fragmented sections of the Alsatian population in opposition to the 
proposal, which triggered the emergence of what was to become known as the autonomist 
movement.  This movement argued for bilingualism, regional administration and the 
protection of regional legislation and culture.  It was able to tap into broader, transnational 
concern for the fate of national minorities in interwar Europe, and some Alsatian militants 
likened the situation in Alsace to that in south Tyrol or the Sudetenland.36  For others, it 
would promote understandings of Alsatians as part of a broader, cross-border community, 
while other autonomists saw it as an attempt to protect regional culture and traditions.37  
Indeed, much of autonomism’s appeal lay in the wide variety of views that it represented, and 
autonomist demands ranged from the protection of the region’s culture to separation from 
France and return to Germany.  For autonomist voters and militants, however, their shared 
concern with the defence of local traditions was more important than their differences.  
Autonomism’s anti-national rhetoric proved particularly worrying to the French 
government, not least as the movement appeared to reflect German designs on Alsace.  In 
1920 the University of Bonn created the Institut für geschichtliche Landeskunde der 
Rheinlande, a regional studies institute financed by the Prussian Higher Education Ministry 
and Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories, which headed a new historiography of the 
Rhineland (including Alsace) and directed its energy towards the ‘struggle over frontiers’ and 
the reunification of the German Volk.38  Such academic support was coupled with financial 
backing that continued after Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann signed the Locarno 
Treaty guaranteeing frontiers in west Europe; by 1927, the Weimar Foreign Office was 
                                                
33 Jean-Claude Richez, Léon Strauss, François Igersheim et Stéphane Jonas, Jacques Peirotes, 1869-1935 et le 
socialisme en Alsace (Strasbourg, 1989). 
34 This party was initially known as the Section Française de l’Internationale Communiste. 
35 Boswell, ‘Franco-Alsatian Conflict,’ 565. 
36 Goodfellow, Between the Swastika, 78. 
37 Goodfellow, Between the Swastika, 14. 
38 Peter Schöttler,‘The Rhine as an Object of Historical Controversy in the Inter-war Years.  Towards a History 
of Frontier Mentalities’, History Workshop Journal, 39 (1995): 1-22, 5-6. 
giving 280,000 RM per year to the Alsatian autonomist cause.39  Demonstrations also offered 
a reminder that Germany hadn’t yet given up on its lost borderland.  In 1925, the year of the 
Locarno agreement, German nationalists celebrated the Rhineland’s millennium as a German 
territory in an anti-French festival held just across the border from Strasbourg.40  
This is not to suggest that German support for autonomism was a driving force of the 
movement.  Indeed, autonomist leaders including Dahlet made it clear that they desired 
cultural self-determination rather than German statehood and welcomed Locarno as the 
renouncement of the Weimar Republic’s claims on Alsace.41  Rather, autonomism reflected 
grievances with the problems in local society that had arisen since the return of Alsace to 
France.42  But, the French government misinterpreted autonomism as the product of German 
manipulation, and viewed expressions of regional belonging with increasing suspicion.  
Meanwhile, Alsatian perceptions of French heavy-handedness did little to calm the situation.  
These problems were the context for attempts by Strasbourg’s politicians and population to 
assert the city’s identity through festivals. 
II 
 
Popular engagement in festivities reveals the importance of Strasbourg’s role as the boundary 
of French territory.  This was particularly notable as the city celebrated its first, and most 
important new national festival, 14 July (or Bastille Day).  This festival had been introduced 
in France in 1880, and prior to 1918, Francophile Alsatians had used the day as a means to 
demonstrate their French patriotism by heading for the border to demonstrate.43  So, on 14 
July 1919, the city’s interim council was keen to put on a striking display.  It produced 
detailed instructions that called upon residents to decorate or illuminate their houses with 
banners or ribbons ‘so that the appearance of the city will correspond with the sentiments that 
animate its citizens on this memorable day.’44  Subsequent Bastille Days saw similar 
combinations of detailed directives and grassroots enthusiasm, as did other commemorations 
of French history; in 1920, large numbers turned out to celebrate the anniversary of the entry 
of French troops on 22 November and the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the 
Third Republic in September.45   
In this way, the city was able to come together to celebrate 14 July and other national 
dates.  But, as city councillors debated how to mark the new calendar of festivities introduced 
by the return to France, and as the population celebrated festivals or commemorated 
important dates in the city’s history, understandings of the city as frontier of France came into 
competition with ideas that it was the heart of a transnational cultural community or a 
regional capital.  Debate over these ideas fed into disunity over the issue of Alsatian 
reintegration, and questions of which French laws and institutions should be introduced 
dominated debates at political meetings in Strasbourg.  Opposing attitudes towards the 
religious question spilled out into debate over Joan of Arc day, after a holiday 
commemorating the Maid of Orléans was introduced by France’s conservative government 
following Joan’s 1920 canonisation.  On Strasbourg’s first Joan of Arc day the council failed 
to illuminate all of the town’s buildings, as it did on Bastille Day and other important 
commemorations.  This provoked harsh criticism of the Socialist council from the Catholic 
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councillor Schies. Mayor Peirotes denied Schies’ charge of unpatriotic behaviour, and 
pointed out that as he had received no instructions from the government on how the festival 
should be celebrated, the town decorated a number of buildings but avoided wasting money 
on unnecessary illuminations.46  
Peirotes’s motivations were not as wholly practical as he implied.  Since the end of 
the nineteenth century, the French left had wrestled to prevent the Catholic right’s annexation 
of Joan of Arc and attempted to present Joan as a republican figure.47  In many ways, 
Peirotes’ response represented a continuation of this struggle.  But, it was also a response to 
local circumstances as the region’s Socialists experienced mounting frustration that their 
demands for the introduction of the separation of Church and State in Alsace went unheeded 
in Paris, and, as a result, the Mayor was keen not to celebrate a Catholic heroine with too 
much enthusiasm.  Indeed, refusal to celebrate sent a potent signal about attitudes towards the 
religious question in the city and Peirotes pointed out that the city’s population had not 
indicated any desire to celebrate the festival.48  
Peirotes had good reason to treat the day as an opportunity to make a broader 
statement.  For outside observers, festivals in Strasbourg offered a means of gauging popular 
opinion in the city, a particularly important point given Strasbourg’s strategic and symbolic 
significance.  As the first reports of Alsatian discontent arrived at the Interior Ministry in 
1921, police officers reassured the government that Strasbourg’s population had celebrated 
14 July enthusiastically, ‘in spite of the developing malaise.’49  By the mid-1920s, 
autonomism gained in momentum and found its first official expression in the Heimatbund 
manifesto of 1926, a declaration signed by 102 Alsatian and Mosellan notables which 
demanded the protection of regional legislation and culture.  Two months later, the Socialist 
daily the Freie Presse described Strasbourg’s ‘spontaneous’ celebration of 14 July as a 
‘categorical response’ to the autonomist movement and affirmation of the city’s patriotism.50 
As autonomism grew in force across Alsace, Raymond Poincaré’s government 
responded by cracking down on the movement. In 1928, fifteen alleged autonomists stood 
trial in Colmar charged with plotting against the French state. The prosecutors failed to 
demonstrate proof of a conspiracy or evidence of funding from Germany, allowing the local 
press to portray the trial as a farce.  Nevertheless, four of the defendants were found guilty, 
imprisoned for a year and banned from entering Alsace for five years.51  The announcement 
of the verdict provoked clashes between supporters and opponents on the streets of 
Strasbourg.  The following year, elections to the city council were won by an autonomist 
coalition known as the Volksfront and made up of the Communist PCF, Catholic UPR and 
the Autonomist Landespartei. The Communist Charles Hueber became Mayor.   
At first, reports suggested that the Volksfront’s victory did not reflect widespread 
anti-French sentiment.  Writing shortly after the elections, Paul Yves Sebillot, editor of La 
France Moderne reported that the tricolour flags at Strasbourg’s 1929 celebrations for Joan 
of Arc were ‘as numerous as those on the Ile de France on 14 July’.  What is more, some 
were so old that they were embossed with the imperial eagle, a ‘testament’, Sebillot noted, ‘to 
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a half century of loyalty to France.’52   The government was further reassured that the council 
was not as anti-French as feared when, on 14 July 1929, the tricolour flew from the town hall 
and the city was illuminated as usual.53   
The situation had changed by the following year, when the Volksfront cancelled 
celebrations, and in 1931 it voted against staging a firework display or illuminating the city’s 
buildings.54  The council put this decision down to their poor relations with Paris, although 
the problems cited by councillors in the discussion reflected political rivalries rather than 
national concerns. Camille Dahlet argued that because the government had refused to 
subsidise the city theatre, the council should feel no need to light up buildings to try to prove 
itself to be a nationalist council.55  Communist councillor Mohn put his vote down to the 
French government’s continued repression and exploitation of the working classes.56  As 
political and national opposition to the government became intertwined, national grievances 
were expressed in the language of local politics.  
The Prefect dismissed the Volksfront’s refusal to celebrate as the result of the 
Alsatians’ ‘natural tendency towards opposition and criticism.’57  However, the council’s 
Alsatian rivals detected more ‘national’ motives; Socialist Marcel-Edmund Naegelen 
interpreted the protest as Germanophilia, informing a rally that Mayor Hueber had gone to 
Germany on 14 July 1930, in a reversal of the pre-war Alsatian habit of heading to France to 
celebrate the national festival.58  This reflected broader concern that the Volksfront was ‘anti-
French’, or even ‘boches’ or ‘amis de boches.’59 These views were shared by the nationalist 
monarchist youth organisation the Camelots du Roi, which took action on 11 November 1930 
by installing projectors in a building on Place Broglie and illuminating the town hall in 
protest at the council’s failure to celebrate 14 July.  When news of the prank spread, a crowd 
gathered in the square calling ‘Down with Hueber!’ and ‘Demission.’60   
That the youth section of the monarchist Action Française should illuminate for 14 
July is revealing of the crisis in Alsatian politics triggered by autonomism.  Elsewhere in 
France it was only after 1936 (and then with great reluctance) that the movement put out flags 
for Bastille Day. But, in Alsace local leaders had long articulated a regionalist platform while 
not whole-heartedly accepting the association’s monarchism, as Samuel Goodfellow has 
shown.61  And, in 1930 these regional specificities spilled out into its rivalry with the 
Volksfront and fear of the council’s pan-Germanism.  In many ways the events of November 
1930 are revealing of a negative response to Hueber rather than positive endorsement of the 
French Republic, but they are also suggestive of the ways in which Alsatian politics were out 
of step with those across France. And, while the Volksfront’s rivals presented the conflict as 
a simple case of ‘for or against France’, the divisions were not quite so straightforward.  
Rather, political debate became focussed on the issue of national attachment, and on this 
occasion broader ideas about language, religion and politics were articulated in national 
terms; the dichotomous positions of ‘pro-French’ or ‘anti-French’ came to mask a range of 
political views, or, as Goodfellow puts it, all political discourse was reduced to the simple 
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dichotomy of autonomism versus assimilationism.62 
The crisis in regional politics took place as Franco-German relations took a turn for 
the worse.  In 1932, Lucien Febvre, Professor at the University of Strasbourg best known for 
his role in the Annales journal, confided in his colleague Marc Bloch his fears that the 
‘frontier of the Rhine has become loaded with hatreds and passions once again.’63 That year, 
Dahlet and Mourer proposed that Strasbourg host the international congress against war, 
stressing that should war break out the city would be at the heart of the battlefield.64  
Moreover, having been a ‘seed of discontent’ in the past, it was likely to find itself in a 
similar position in the future and should, as a result, take the lead in setting the pacifist 
agenda.65  In proposing the congress, Dahlet and Mourer attempted (unsuccessfully) to stress 
that the city’s role as a bridge could be useful in geopolitical terms as well as in culture. 
In 1933, Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party seized power in Germany, triggering a flow of 
thousands of Jewish, political and social refugees into Strasbourg from across the Rhine.66  
International tension was compounded by economic catastrophe as Alsace felt the lingering 
effects of the global crisis that followed the Wall Street Crash; investment dried up and 
unemployment levels rose, and by the middle of the decade, the Alsatian prefects reported 
that the economic situation had replaced events in Germany as the main worry facing the 
population.67  Economic concerns and fear about German intentions contributed to an anti-
Volksfront movement, which secured the city hall in 1935 and the conservative Democrat 
Charles Frey was elected Mayor.  Frey’s period in office saw the construction of 
fortifications which reasserted Strasbourg’s identity as a defensive frontier.68  And, festivities 
during Frey’s period in office were increasingly planned with an eye on Germany as an 
attempt to stress Alsatian attachment to France.  In 1938, organisers attempted to recapture 
the atmosphere of November 1918 in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of 
Strasbourg’s liberation by the French army.  Processions marched along the streets, while the 
surviving members of the Reception Committee reunited, wearing their original armbands 
from 1918.69  The following year, when celebrating the 150th anniversary of the French 
Revolution of 1789, the press encouraged the population to celebrate with as much fervour as 
possible, given that Germany would be monitoring events in the city.70  By the end of the 
1930s, fear of war ensured that presentations of the city as the defensive limits of France took 
precedence over other ideas of the city’s role.   
 Through use of the city’s spaces to celebrate national and political festivals, urban 
politics played an important role in shaping a locally formed, grassroots sense of attachment.  
Ideas of Strasbourg as the heart of a cross-border community or a regional capital ran through 
these debates and challenged the dominant understanding of the city as bastion of Frenchness.  
But, the changing context created by the return to France and by shifting Franco-German 
relations meant that it was Strasbourg’s place within the French nation that Alsatians tended 
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to stress first, and, when Alsatians did assert alternative visions of their city, they adopted 
national language to express themselves.  Thus, celebrations in Strasbourg were engines for 
the complex debates about nationhood which were played out after 1918. These debates 
found further expression in discussions over monuments, as Parisian and Alsatian elites 





After Strasbourg’s return to France, committees, societies, newspapers and individuals from 
across the globe offered donations of statues, sculptures and busts to the city.71  These gifts 
had two interrelated aims; firstly, to fill the empty spaces left by the destruction of German 
monuments, and secondly to imprint Strasbourg with symbols of French patriotism.  Yet 
debates over the construction and placement of monuments also afford a glimpse into the 
range of attitudes towards French nationhood and connections with Germany.  As was the 
case with discussion of festivities, debates about monument construction in Strasbourg reveal 
the co-existence and competition of ideas of the city as an integral part of France, as a 
regional centre and as the heart of a cross-border community.  But they are also suggestive of 
the redrawing of alliances triggered by reintegration. Individuals mobilised the same ideas 
about the border for different political purposes, using inconsistent and sometimes 
contradictory language in different contexts.  The major statues to be planned in interwar 
Strasbourg reflected these rival and intersecting views of regional and national history. 
 As had been the case with festivities, plans for statues in the city also focussed first 
upon national history.  In the case of Strasbourg’s first interwar monument, a statue 
honouring the Marseillaise, the initiative was taken outside the city when President Raymond 
Poincaré and Albert de Dietrich, a descendent of Strasbourg’s eighteenth century mayor 
Friedrich de Dietrich, formed a monument committee to commemorate the national hymn’s 
composition in Strasbourg in 1792.72  The committee was formed during the war and planned 
the monument to celebrate Alsace’s return to France in the event of a French victory.73  After 
the armistice, the committee rapidly decided upon a sculptor, commissioned the form of the 
statue (which depicted three soldiers brandishing the tricolour) and proposed that the 
monument should be placed in the Place de la République, the former Kaiserplatz and the 
heart of the German new town, as a highly symbolic replacement to the statue of Wilhelm I, 
which had been torn down in November 1918.74   
In May 1919 Strasbourg’s council subscribed to the committee as a Founding 
Member and pledged 100 000 francs to the statue.75  The council then chose the construction 
materials and the statue’s eventual site, in Place Broglie close to de Dietrich’s former house.76  
The change of location is suggestive of the different attitudes towards the statue held by the 
council and by the monument committee.  The council rejected the straightforward 
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replacement of the Kaiser by the Marseillaise and instead opted to place the statue in the old 
town, close to the house in which it was composed.  This location underlined the region’s role 
in national history; for the council there was no need to replace one set of national symbols 
with another, as the city had its own, existing symbolism and history.  Similarly, there was no 
need to impose a French identity onto the recovered region, as Alsatians would be actively 
involved in the reimagining of their region’s place within France. 
The filtering of national symbols through local understandings was reinforced at the 
placement of the first stone in June 1922 when Radical councillor François Oesigner paid 
tribute to Alsace, which was ‘at the forefront of all the great republican and revolutionary 
movements which made France one and indivisible, and which created the magnificent, 
democratic France of 1918.’77  In speeches and pamphlets the city council presented the 
monument as the fusion of national and local history, stressing the Strasbourgeois origins of 
the anthem and the role of Alsatians in the Revolution of 1789.  At the monument’s unveiling 
on 14 July 1922, Socialist Mayor Jacques Peirotes took pains to show that while the statue 
may have been a ‘top down’ initiative thought up by a Parisian committee, Strasbourg had 
embraced it as its own.  And, the monument became a focus for the celebration of national 
festivals, as, in its attachment ‘to the ideas of liberty and equality that inspired the 
Marseillaise,’ the city shared celebrations of Bastille Day with the rest of France.78  
Nevertheless, local politics controversies ensured that Peirotes also made reference to the 
population’s continued attachment to all ‘republican institutions.’79  By this, of course, he 
meant the laws of religious separation, and by making them part of his speech he transformed 
the monument into an intervention into the debate about the reintegration of Alsace into 
France.  
If the Marseillaise revealed divergent attitudes towards Alsatian reintegration, 
monuments could also reveal of a range of attitudes towards the border.  In December 1928, 
Fritz Beblo, Chief Architect of the Bavarian city of Munich and former Stadtbauinspektor of 
Strasbourg proposed that Strasbourg swap its statue of Father Rhine, which had been installed 
by the imperial government in 1903, for a monument of the Meiselocker, or ‘Bird Catcher’.80 
The Meiselocker paid homage to an ancient nickname that the Strasbourgeois held in Alsace, 
and depicted a young boy with a flute, which, according to the legend, he used to attract birds 
that he then sold at the city’s markets.  Socialist Mayor Peirotes accepted the offer, and 
Father Rhine was unveiled in its new position in Munich in 1932.  Although Father Rhine 
had never been a particularly popular monument in Strasbourg, its replacement did not meet 
with universal approval; the Sculptors’ Guild protested at the replacement of the popular 
‘Vater Rhein’ by the unknown Meiselocker, and inhabitants of the Place Saint Etienne, in 
which the council planned to place the new monument, complained about its aesthetics.81  
Controversy over the statue went beyond its appearance, however.  At its unveiling 
the Volksfront, which had recently won the town hall, attempted to offer the Meiselocker as 
an alternative symbol for Alsace: one that reflected its position as a bridge between France 
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and Germany.  Autonomist councillor Heil made a speech which focussed on the need for 
further cultural exchange with Germany.82  This reflected the attitudes of the new council to 
Strasbourg’s role as a border city; three months later Communist-Autonomist Mayor Hueber 
would stress that ‘the Rhine separates countries, not men.’83 But, while this view reflected 
widely held and longstanding understandings of Strasbourg, Franco-German tension meant 
that its articulation in 1930 was problematic. The conservative Alsatian press labelled Heil’s 
speech a ‘provocation’ to the majority of the Strasbourgeois population and a ‘challenge’ to 
France, concerns which were echoed both in other Alsatian political circles and in the 
corridors of power in Paris.84  
Heil’s oratory represented one of the clearest challenges to the idea of Strasbourg as a 
boundary, while the response he received is revealing of the splintering of Alsatian opinion 
by the beginning of the 1930s. These differences were crystallised the following year during 
discussions over the statue of Victor Hugo and Lamartine in 1931.  As we have seen, 
Autonomist councillor Camille Dahlet criticised the monument as an attempt to impose a 
‘Parisian’ sense of national identity onto the population of Alsace.  Yet, unlike the 
Marseillaise or the Meiselocker, the idea for the monument to Lamartine and Hugo came 
from Strasbourg itself.85  The monument’s committee was made up of conservative, 
Francophile Alsatians including University Rector Christian Pfister and Professor Robert 
Redslob.  The committee envisaged the monument as a vibrant national symbol depicting 
Strasbourg’s return to France, and requested Parisian help in financing the project by 
stressing Alsace’s constant loyalty to France during the years of annexation.86  The 
monument would thus be a great French patriotic gesture: a statement that Alsace ‘was to be 
definitively French, and that the German era was forgotten’.87 And, like the councillors who 
had embraced the statue of the Marseillaise, the committee connected the monument with the 
history of Strasbourg; Hugo had written of the Cathedral, while Lamartine had paid homage 
to Gutenberg and the Marseillaise.88 
But, like the Meiselocker, this monument also needed to reflect Strasbourg’s position 
on the border.  This gave the city a double duty, firstly to inform and warn France of any 
potential hostility as and when necessary, and secondly to bring the ‘treasures of German 
culture to France.’89  Redslob envisioned the Hugo-Lamartine statue alongside the existing 
statues of Schiller and Goethe as a signal of Alsace’s position as a bridge, and a sign that 
Strasbourg merited its moniker ‘city of roads.’90   That Redslob would argue for both the 
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erasure of memories of the German era and for Strasbourg as a bridge is revealing of the 
complexities of the situation in interwar Strasbourg.  The same people mobilised different 
ideas in different contexts.  Equally, different people could mobilise the same ideas to support 
different purposes.  Both Redslob and Heil articulated a view of Strasbourg as a cultural 
meeting point, yet the two men used this idea in very different ways.  For Redslob it was an 
integral part of the region’s French patriotism, while for Heil it reflected Alsatian uniqueness 
and underscored his argument against the introduction of French laws, language and 
institutions into the region.  
By the middle of the 1930s, the international situation continued to interact with local 
concerns as the council discussed commemoration of the Great War.  The city had agreed to 
erect a monument in the early 1920s, but no statue was erected in Strasbourg until 1936.91  
This was, in part, due to aesthetic concerns and the failure of the council to agree upon a 
monument.  Given complaints about the ‘tasteless’ war memorials erected elsewhere in the 
region, it was important that the monument in Alsace’s most high profile city would be 
fitting.92  But it is likely that the delay also reflected what William Shane Story has identified 
as a more general reluctance to embark upon commemorative projects to avoid the airing of 
discord or uncertainty about the past.93  After all, Alsace had fought for Germany but was 
now part of France.  As a result, the way in which the monument should commemorate the 
dead was politically sensitive for the city, and indeed for Alsace as a whole. The monument 
was eventually unveiled in October 1936 and finally filled the space at the centre of the Place 
de la République, which had been much coveted as a symbolic commemorative space.  The 
monument featured a mother as an allegory for Strasbourg holding her two dead sons in her 
arms; one son represented the Alsatians who had fought for France and the other those who 
had fought for Germany.   
Elizabeth Vlossak has pointed out that the Strasbourg memorial is unusual amongst 
Alsatian monuments to the Great War, as most of the region’s towns opted to depict either 
solitary women or female allegories.  In these monuments, mothers were not simply a 
universal figure of collective sorrow.  They also allowed the avoidance of the awkward 
question of whether to depict Alsatian soldiers in French or German uniform.94  Strasbourg’s 
monument instead attempted to capture the contemporary pacifist mood through its depiction 
of two dead soldiers who linked hands in death, with neither wearing his uniform. Its 
inscription read ‘A Nos Morts’ without specifying the nation for which the men had died.  
But, it did not go so far as a bilingual inscription, as the committee feared that this may prove 
too controversial.  The speech delivered by President Albert Lebrun at the unveiling reflected 
the pacifist tone of the monument; after stressing the historic links between Alsace and 
France he recalled the tragedy of 1918, when brothers were called upon to fight against each 
other and appealed ‘Let our hands, like theirs, seek and find each other.  That they would also 
reach across borders in a generous gesture, a movement of rapprochement, entente and 
peace.’95  Through the monument, ideas of Alsatian victimhood interacted with 
understandings of the city’s history and with local and international politics.  In an 
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atmosphere of Franco-German tension, the monument signalled more than regional history.  
It reflected broader, European sentiments and an appeal for peace and unity.   
In Strasbourg, the construction of monuments contributed to the reimagining of the 
city’s place within the French nation after its return in 1918.  But it also brought into relief 
the clash that developed over attitudes towards national belonging and the role of the border.  
Alsatians responded in different ways to the proposals of monument committees to erect 
statues in Strasbourg. Through such interventions monuments, like festivals, became a means 
to shape and influence the process of reintegration and to express local attitudes towards 
Alsace’s position on the Rhine.  And throughout, the lack of agreement within different 
groups limited the impact of the symbols that they proposed for Alsace. 
As had been the case with festivals, debates over monuments reveal that the meaning 
invested in the border changed over time.  Christopher Fischer’s work on regionalism in the 
period between 1890 and 1929 has shown that ideas of Alsace’s dual culture changed from 
the late imperial period, when they were used in favour of a return to France, to the period 
after 1918, when they were increasingly used in defence of a cultural national minority.96  
The interwar years saw further transformation, as ideas of Strasbourg as a regional centre or a 
cross-border bridge co-existed and competed with the dominant understanding of the city as 
the limits of France. Divergences of opinion arose within groups of allies, such as the 
autonomists, whose failure to agree upon appropriate symbols for Alsace hampered their 
attempts to represent Alsatian specificity.  Equally, political enemies like Redslob and Heil 
used the same ideas in support of different positions, as understandings of Strasbourg’s 




In 1940, Alsace was annexed into the Third Reich and attached to Baden under the authority 
of Gauleiter Robert Wagner.  Many of the changes that Strasbourg had witnessed between the 
wars were reversed; Français de l’Intérieur left to be replaced by migrants from the Reich, 
street names were translated into German, major squares and thoroughfares renamed, and 
monuments destroyed.  The new rules banned expressions of French identity, such as wearing 
a beret or celebrating 14 July, and placed restrictions upon the movement of people, 
particularly across the border into occupied France. At the War’s end, the French state 
embarked upon its own projects to reverse the Germanisation of the war years.  In 1945, 
Strasbourg’s military governor requested that German Prisoners of War be sent from Alsace 
to southern France and that Italian POWs be dispatched in their place with the aim of 
introducing some Latin culture into the city.97   Like their wartime and interwar predecessors, 
the post-war government failed to recognise that in the eyes of many Alsatians, a dual culture 
was natural in a borderland, not a reflection of the suspect nationalism of its inhabitants.   
Urban politics through festivities and monuments in interwar Strasbourg thus afford a 
glimpse into the complex development of national attachment in Alsace. Alsatians worked 
with groups and individuals from outside the region in reimaging Strasbourg’s urban spaces, 
yet their relations should not be understood as a two-way interaction.  Rather, national 
integration proved a multi-centred struggle, engaging a range of national and international 
stakeholders with different visions of the city’s past, present and future, and distinct 
understandings of the ways in which regional and national identity should be reconciled.  
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Nevertheless, in discussions of urban politics, Alsatians adopted the language of frontiers and 
expressed local understandings in national terms.  Thus, the local, the national and the 
international became inseparable in the city, and such discussions interacted with debates 
about the border as festivities and monuments became mechanisms used by the city’s 
population to understand the world around them.   
Through these discussions the city’s population adopted and appropriated existing 
ideas about the frontier and made them their own, as the dominant idea of Strasbourg as the 
frontier of France was challenged by ideas of the city as a cross-border bridge or regional 
capital. The resulting clash between the different expressions of national belonging reveals 
the divergent attitudes held between the centre and the periphery, but also amongst different 
groups in Alsace.  As we have seen, ideas of the border were mobilised to support a range of 
causes and individuals sometimes said different things in different contexts.   In this 
environment, allegiances were re-configured not just across the border, but also along it 
amongst different groups in Alsace.  This produced some surprising political coalitions, from 
the Communists, Autonomists and Catholics in the Volksfront, to the Socialist-Conservative 
Democrat group that came together to challenge them.  These political realignments reflect 
the complexity of the situation in the borderland, where individuals outside Redslob’s milieu 
shared his understanding that the city’s geographical and cultural situation gave it a unique 
position as mediator between French and German culture, and where opponents of 
autonomism agreed with the autonomists Mourer and Dahlet that the city’s geopolitical 
position bestowed upon it the role of peacemaker between the French and German nations.  
This is not to suggest that either the idea of the ‘frontier of France’ or ‘bridge across the 
Rhine’ was an empty vessel.  Rather, both ideas became part of lived experience and were 
made meaningful by the city’s population. 
In this sense, this study of urban politics reveals how the multiple meanings invested 
in the border affected relations between Alsace, France and Germany.  The city acted as both 
a frontier and a point of contact.  But, when Alsatians talked about the border, these two ideas 
did not co-exist peacefully.  At moments of political or economic crisis the rhetoric of 
borders as meeting points evaporated to be replaced by a stress upon the border as a dividing 
line. And, just as borders themselves are transient and moveable, so the meanings invested in 
borders are fluid, and change over time.  The bridge across the Rhine of the 1920s 
increasingly became a frontier of France in the 1930s, before becoming an outpost of the 
German Empire after 1940.  In post-war Europe it retained its symbolic importance; by 1949, 
it had become the agreed site for the Council of Europe and was to become the home to the 
European Parliament and a city synonymous with changing attitudes towards borders across 
Europe. 
 
 
